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The Teacher 
Comparative Political Philosophy and Liberal Education: 
"Looking for Friends in History"' 
Stephen G. Salkever, Bryn Mawr College 
Michael Nylan, Bryn Mawr College 
Over the past eight years, we 
have jointly taught a series of 
courses comparing Chinese and 
European political philosophy. 
These courses have convinced us 
that teaching comparative political 
philosophy is a way of doing two 
eminently desirable-but seemingly 
incompatible-things at once: 
broadening the college curriculum 
by teaching texts from outside the 
Western tradition, and carrying out 
the historical job of liberal educa- 
tion by teaching students to be- 
come critical and articulate readers 
of interpretable texts. In our expe- 
rience, there is no necessary in- 
compatibility between liberal edu- 
cation and internationalizing the 
curriculum. To the contrary, we 
believe that at present neither of 
them will flourish without the 
other. We think that friends of the 
"great books" and friends of "mul- 
ticulturalism" can and should share 
an extensive common ground, a 
ground we try to clarify here by 
making some proposals about the 
character of liberal education and 
by discussing ways in which teach- 
ing comparative political philoso- 
phy has helped us put these pro- 
posals into practice. 
Defining the Problem 
The kind of teaching that we 
(like most teachers of political the- 
ory) are comfortable with intro- 
duces students to books that 
present a variety of implicit and 
explicit claims about how lives 
should be lived and communities 
organized. These books are chosen 
on the basis of several not always 
harmonious criteria: their historical 
importance (since part of liberal 
education is coming to terms with a 
particular historical past or tradi- 
tion); the extent to which they are 
open to conflicting interpretations 
(since critical interpretation and 
argument about the meaning of 
words and things is the practice 
that defines the liberal classroom); 
and the extent to which they can 
be read with an eye to questions 
and problems of the present (since 
liberal education is justified largely 
by its capacity to encourage delib- 
eration and informed action in the 
future). 
In deciding what books to teach, 
we worry less about adhering to 
conventional genre distinctions 
than about finding books that de- 
mand active and critical response, 
ones that incline us to reconsider 
the past and to imagine ourselves 
as participants in a continuing 
"conversation" about the shape of 
life in the future. Our goal in the 
classroom is not to transmit facts 
or values in any simple way; we 
aim to foster the preferences, 
skills, and habits of mind that sup- 
port lives of persistent curiosity 
and self-reflection. 
Liberal education understood in 
this way involves a balance of dif- 
ferent and sometimes conflicting 
goods, so it is perhaps not surpris- 
ing that the very notion of liberal 
education has been the subject of 
heated debate in America for most 
of this century. Nor should it sur- 
prise us that the most rhetorically 
successful formulations about lib- 
eral education are those that im- 
plicitly deny its complexity by re- 
ducing it to one of its constituent 
elements.2 The current "canon 
wars" illustrate this drift to over- 
simplification. It is difficult not to 
feel both sympathy and impatience 
with traditionalist arguments that 
the core of American liberal educa- 
tion should be a reverent celebra- 
tion of the classics of the Western 
tradition, which are taken to pro- 
vide permanent standards for judg- 
ments of truth and beauty. It is no 
less difficult not to feel conflicting 
emotions when presented with the 
usual radical arguments that such 
reverence papers over conflicts and 
injustices. 
Traditionalists are right in claim- 
ing that an education refusing to 
engage Plato and Shakespeare as 
important teachers is short-sighted 
and thin. But radicals are right to 
insist that lists of books to be 
taught are not necessary phenom- 
ena imposing themselves on us like 
fate or a god, but constructed 
courses of study, establishing or 
preserving a particular version of 
the connection between the past 
and the present. The radicals are 
also right to insist that in develop- 
ing college curricula we attend to 
changes in the character of the 
American undergraduate population 
and the society as a whole, recog- 
nizing that the classroom is no 
longer the exclusive preserve of 
white males, and that by the end of 
the decade European-Americans 
will no longer comprise a majority 
of the American population. 
Traditionalists are wrong not to 
see these changes in the direction 
of a more diverse society as oppor- 
tunities rather than threats, not to 
consider that "one of the most lib- 
erating effects of liberal education 
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is in coming to see one's own cul- 
ture as one possible form of life 
and sensibility among others."3 But 
the radicals are wrong to think that 
the only appropriate stance toward 
books traditionally included in the 
canon is that of the avenging un- 
masker; worse, they may be blind 
to the way the analytic and evalua- 
tive categories that drive their radi- 
calism rest on an unreflective privi- 
leging of one voice within that 
traditional canon, often a Marxist 
or a Nietzschean voice, rather than 
on genuine alternatives to the 
canon as such. 
What is particularly exasperating 
about the canon wars debate is that 
both sides, in their eagerness to 
score points against each other, 
tend to ignore the most powerful 
ideological force in contemporary 
American undergraduate educa- 
tion-the practically hegemonic 
doctrine that such education must 
be organized on the lines of the 
academic disciplines as defined by 
the leading research universities. 
The dominance of this orthodoxy 
of disciplinary specialization seems 
to guarantee that the battles be- 
tween traditionalists and radicals 
will be little more than noisy 
squabbles over limited stretches of 
curricular turf. 
For the majority of the American 
professoriate, liberal education is 
nothing other than the name we 
give to a collection of different 
scholarly disciplines, and the heart 
of such education at the college 
level is rigorous training in a major. 
As disciplinary sub-specialties pro- 
liferate4 and technical vocabularies 
multiply, the likelihood becomes 
less and less that the college 
courses offered by the major disci- 
plines will have much to contribute 
to the project of liberal education 
as we understand it.5 The canon 
wars adversaries, the radicals and 
the traditionalists, each oversim- 
plify a complex task, but both 
know that liberal education cannot 
be taken to equal the sum of estab- 
lished research disciplines. Our 
problem, then, as teachers of politi- 
cal philosophy, lies in finding ways 
to embrace the partial goods cham- 
pioned separately by traditionalism 
and radicalism, while at the same 
time maintaining the kind of rigor 
that has come to be associated al- 
most exclusively with scholarly 
work in the disciplines. 
But Is It Really 
"Philosophy"? 
When we began to plan our first 
course in Chinese and Greek politi- 
cal philosophy, we welcomed the 
chance to learn to read and discuss 
new and interesting books, with 
students and with each other. One 
of us is a specialist in Greek politi- 
cal philosophy who knew practi- 
cally nothing about China; the 
other a specialist in the Chinese 
classics who knew little about 
Greece. We have since then jointly 
Our problem, then, as 
teachers of political 
philosophy, lies in finding 
ways to embrace 
the partial goods 
championed separately 
by traditionalism and 
radicalism, while at the 
same time maintaining 
the kind of rigor that 
has come to be 
associated almost 
exclusively with scholarly 
work in the disciplines. 
taught three courses combining 
Chinese and European texts. Each 
course begins from a particular 
problem that seems to be shared by 
Chinese and European thinkers, 
and the principal activity in all of 
them is a close reading of a rela- 
tively small number of works.6 
For example, our first course, on 
the origins of philosophy in China 
and Greece, began with what has 
been called the Socratic question, 
"What sort of life should I lead," 
the question that Plato's Socrates 
compels his interlocutors to con- 
front in the Republic and the Gor- 
gias. Plausibly seen as the event 
that initiates moral and political 
philosophy in the West, we suggest 
that Socrates' question can with 
equal justice be called Confucius's 
question, insofar as Confucius like 
Socrates insists that his pupils ask 
novel and profound questions about 
their society and its practices-all 
the while denying that he has any- 
thing new to teach.7 
To make a long story short, we 
treat Confucius and Socrates not as 
authors of doctrines to compare, 
nor as representative thinkers of 
their respective "cultures,"8 but as 
figures who use analogous modes 
of unsettling, critical self-inquiry. 
Socrates does this by insisting on a 
fresh examination of familiar con- 
cepts like excellence (arete) and 
good (agathon), and placing famil- 
iar patterns of social life, such as 
laws (nomoi) and crafts (technai), 
in a new light in a way that leads to 
further reflection; Confucius prob- 
lematizes the traditional meanings 
assigned to familiar terms like hu- 
manity (jen), ceremony (li), and the 
gentleman (chin tzu), and does so 
in such a way that the reader is led 
to connect particular terms and 
practices with some elusive yet 
somehow intelligible whole.9 Read 
in this way, the Confucius and 
Socrates our courses presuppose 
are neither timeless thinkers ab- 
stracted from historical context nor 
typical or official Chinese or Greek 
voices; we are, to borrow a phrase 
from the fourth-century B.C. Con- 
fucian philosopher, Mencius, 
"looking for friends in history.'10 
To this point we have been 
speaking of Chinese philosophy 
without remarking on the phrase. 
But the idea that philosophy exists 
only or primarily in the West-it is, 
after all, a Greek word-has been 
widespread, especially among those 
identified with the contemporary 
academic discipline that goes by 
that name. The orthodox view is 
stated by John Passmore, in his 
article, "Philosophy," in the latest 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Pass- 
more sharply distinguishes true phi- 
losophy from poetry or sagehood 
(both of which he regards as the 
same woolly minded thing): dis- 
course counts as philosophy if it is 
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a "clear, articulate, discussible sys- 
tem of ideas and principles." Given 
that criterion for philosophy, Pass- 
more says that, "What is com- 
monly called 'Chinese philosophy' 
. . consists almost entirely of the 
pronouncements of sages" (Pass- 
more, 1967, 216-18). 
This notion of how to separate 
philosophy from other forms of ex- 
pression is widespread, and is the 
way the term philosophy is used in 
academic departments of philoso- 
phy within the Anglo-American 
analytic tradition.1 But this is a 
conception of philosophy that is 
historically limited and tied to con- 
troversial substantive presupposi- 
tions about the character of inquiry 
and reality. The notion of philoso- 
phy as systematic and as free from 
ambiguity as possible12 dates from 
the seventeenth-century efforts of 
Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza to 
establish a basis of absolute cer- 
tainty for scientific inquiry, modi- 
fied by Kant's eighteenth-century 
shift of analytic focus from the 
foundations of world to the founda- 
tions of human understanding. 
Such a conception of philosophy 
excludes not only Chinese philoso- 
phy but pre-modern Europeans like 
Plato and Aristotle, who were any- 
thing but systematic and who re- 
jected the idea that the system and 
precision of mathematics or sym- 
bolic logic provide appropriate 
models for philosophic reasoning 
and philosophic discourse.13 
Every philosopher wishes to be 
as systematic and univocal as pos- 
sible-the substantive disagreement 
between Passmore and the Carte- 
sians on the one hand and the an- 
cient Chinese and Greek thinkers 
on the other is over the extent to 
which it is necessary to call atten- 
tion to and preserve verbal ambigu- 
ity, and to use modes of argument 
other than deductive entailment in 
order to give a picture of the world 
that clarifies rather than distorts the 
human situation. 
There is another way of conceiv- 
ing philosophy, one that fits our 
intentions better without including 
every kind of belief or expression. 
Philosophy brings to consciousness 
and articulateness those prevailing 
orientations toward and beliefs 
about individuals, society, and the 
cosmos that are otherwise tacit-in 
effect, philosophy begins with the 
Socratic/Confucian question about 
how we should live, and not with 
the Cartesian or Kantian impulse 
toward certainty and system. Phi- 
losophizing of the Socratic/Confu- 
cian kind indeed demands a certain 
kind of rationality by insisting that 
reasons be given for accepting as 
good or true what we might other- 
wise do or believe out of ancient 
custom or pious awe-but this is 
not rationality on the model of de- 
ductive proof, and it may well be 
one that calls for expression in po- 
etry or aphorism or story rather 
than bare prose.14 This conception 
of rationality presupposes a world 
in which our fundamental questions 
have greater stability and perma- 
nence than any answers we may 
give them. The point of philoso- 
phizing in such a world is to bring 
those questions to consciousness, 
not to supply precise and absolute 
solutions. 
Philosophy thus appears as an 
ever-present human possibility, 
rather than the systematized and 
mathematicized thought of a partic- 
ular individual or group; the danger 
to be avoided here is the reduction 
of practical philosophic inquiry to 
scientistic "ethnophilosophy. "15 
Comparative philosophy must resist 
the inclination to explain philo- 
sophic texts of a particular culture 
as superstructural representations 
of the "essence" of that culture 
(Nussbaum and Sen 1989, 302). We 
are all familiar with the better 
known examples of this infectious 
temptation. 
In comparing Chinese and Greek 
texts, for example, we may be told 
that the key to their meaning lies in 
material conditions,16 or in the at- 
tributes of one culture that seem to 
be "missing" in the other; for ex- 
ample the asserted "absence" of a 
"scientific revolution" or of the 
verb "to be" (Graham), or of cos- 
mogonic myths (Mote), or of indi- 
vidual military heroes (Keightley) 
in China. Such "missing" at- 
tributes are used by different au- 
thors to demonstrate either the in- 
feriority or the superiority of 
Chinese to Europeans,17 but what- 
ever their evaluative use, "missing 
attribute" analyses elevate a partial 
truth to the status of a core explan- 
atory reality, and in the process 
make each text and culture so ex- 
otic to the other that any inter-tex- 
tual or inter-cultural dialogue be- 
comes impossible.18 
Course Planning Strategies 
In designing courses, we have 
avoided organizing the syllabuses 
as surveys; instead, we try to have 
each course focus on one perma- 
nent human problem confronted in 
two very different places: for in- 
stance, how to think one's way 
outside the limits of prescribed so- 
cial roles; how to imagine and re- 
spond to death; or how to combine 
innovation and continuity in societ- 
ies where traditional authority has 
been shaken. Of course, each 
philosophic text speaks to a num- 
ber of interesting problems, so 
class discussion will inevitably (and 
rightly) drift into a number of areas 
unrelated to the initial problem 
used to organize the course. 
The word we choose to name the 
context in which these problems 
arise-whether culture, or world of 
thought (following Benjamin 
Schwartz), or tradition-is not im- 
portant, but the problem of how we 
understand that context matters a 
great deal and needs to be carefully 
considered by those of us inter- 
ested in reading philosophic texts 
in a comparative way. We need to 
avoid going too far in the direction 
of reducing texts to context by 
treating them as a mere products of 
culture forces; such a reductive 
explanation makes it impossible to 
take the text seriously as a 
"friend" to argue with. But we 
also need to avoid the opposite er- 
ror of treating the texts as abso- 
lutely context-free, as isolated mir- 
acles of timelessness whose authors 
were our immediate contemporar- 
ies, for this would be to discount 
the difficulties inherent in translat- 
ing and understanding our "friends." 
In other words, in comparative 
philosophy we need to bear in mind 
both the existence of boundaries 
and the possibility of boundary 
crossing. To appreciate the strange- 
ness of a text while at the same 
time looking for ways to connect 
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its language to ours, it may help to 
borrow Gadamer's notion of the 
"horizon," by which he means the 
questions to which each text can be 
seen as an answer.19 To establish a 
"horizon" for an intelligent first 
reading of Plato's Apology or the 
Confucian Analects, we need a 
sense of fifth-century Athens or Lu 
so that we can bring the appropri- 
ate questions to our texts. But the 
texts must then be seen as active 
and individual responses to those 
questions-not as what the typical 
Greek or Chinese philosopher 
would say.20 
There is no single right way to 
organize comparative courses, but 
there are several considerations we 
think are important. First, in plan- 
ning the course, do not set it up as 
two consecutive historical survey 
courses (e.g., half a term on Chi- 
nese classics followed by half a 
term on Greek classics). The object 
is to draw tentative comparisons 
between individual texts from dif- 
ferent traditions as soon as possi- 
ble. As you can see from the ap- 
pended syllabuses, we've tried to 
do this in various ways. We have 
also discovered that almost any 
pairing of two texts can work, so 
that it is pointless to agonize over 
whether Plato is better paired with 
Confucius or Chuang Tzu. As the 
course proceeds, comparisons can 
be made freely both within and 
across cultures, so long as one al- 
ways bears in mind that the point 
of these comparisons is not to 
come up with or test the truth of 
generalizations about cultural simi- 
larities and differences,21 but to be- 
come more sensitive and more ac- 
tive listeners to the individual 
voices in the books we read. 
Second, it seems to work better 
to organize courses around prob- 
lems that arise in the texts and in 
our lives, rather than chronologi- 
cally or by concepts central to con- 
temporary disciplinary concerns. It 
wouldn't make sense, for example, 
to have a course structured around 
the problem of how the ancient 
Chinese writers might come down 
on the issue of communitarianism 
versus Rawlsian liberalism. Nor 
should you aim at a thorough his- 
torical survey, although we have 
found that dealing with works from 
roughly the same historical period 
helps keep students from feeling 
hopelessly at sea. The particular 
content of the course should be 
determined by the people who are 
going to teach it, and will reflect 
their own interests and areas of 
expertise, as do our three sylla- 
buses printed below. 
Writing frequent papers 
gives our students the 
chance both to solidify 
their understanding of 
the readings and to try 
out different ways of 
constructing an active 
response to different 
kinds of texts. 
This is also true of the mix of 
books from different traditions-it 
isn't necessary to have half from 
one tradition and half from the 
other. Nevertheless, it is important 
to have some care about the pro- 
portions, lest students get the im- 
pression that one tradition is some- 
how more important and more 
valuable because it is the source of 
more of the readings. In our "Ori- 
gins of Philosophy" class, the texts 
are approximately half Chinese and 
half Greek. In "Piety and Death" 
and "Brave New Worlds," the 
ratio is 2/3 European to 1/3 Chi- 
nese-since here there were three 
teachers, two of us European spe- 
cialists. This may be as unbalanced 
as we would want to go. 
Above all, we caution against 
including only one non-Western 
text in a course that is otherwise 
strictly Western. It is absolutely 
necessary to indicate that neither 
the Chinese nor the Western tradi- 
tion is monolithic, and that they are 
interesting to us precisely because 
they contain rich debates over sub- 
stantial practical and theoretical 
issues. To include one non-Western 
book as if it somehow "represent- 
ed" the Chinese, or, worse, the 
"third world perspective," distorts 
more than it illuminates. 
The best way to avoid the urge 
to turn books into emissaries from 
exotic cultures is to familiarize 
yourself as soon as possible with 
the contending alternatives within 
the tradition that is new to you as a 
teacher. For those first encounter- 
ing Chinese philosophy, Arthur 
Waley's Three Ways of Thought in 
Ancient China is a fine place to be- 
gin, as are Benjamin Schwartz's 
Search for Wealth and Power and 
World of Thought in Ancient 
China, and A.C. Graham's Disput- 
ers of the Tao, since all these 
books alert the reader to the com- 
plexity of the tradition as they dis- 
pel stereotypic conceptions of the 
Chinese Geist.22 
Once you have settled on texts, 
the next question is how to balance 
lecture and discussion-in other 
words, how to balance the need for 
establishing a contextual back- 
ground against the need to allow 
students to develop their own read- 
ings of the texts. Both are neces- 
sary, and finding the right mix will 
depend on local factors. We have 
done it in two ways: in the "Ori- 
gins" course (an upper-level semi- 
nar), whoever is the specialist for 
the day's reading leads the discus- 
sion, supplying background as nec- 
essary. In lower-level courses, one 
lecture a week given by the resi- 
dent expert precedes two weekly 
meetings for discussion. It is a 
good idea to modify the "experts 
first" rule over time as the nonex- 
pert faculty become more familiar 
with new material; this makes it 
clear that you don't have to be an 
expert to raise good questions 
about a text. 
Finally, there is the matter of 
student assignments. Putting a lot 
of weight on quizzes and examina- 
tions, or on a long research or term 
paper, is a sure way to undermine 
the goals of the course. Students 
should write as many short papers 
as possible (between four and 
seven papers a term), ideally of 
varying length (from two to ten 
pages). If students are required to 
write a number of shorter papers, 
the stakes involved in writing each 
are lowered, and the chances for 
improving over the course of the 
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term are increased. Writing fre- 
quent papers gives our students the 
chance both to solidify their under- 
standing of the readings and to try 
out different ways of constructing 
an active response to different 
kinds of texts. We give students 
the option of rewriting their papers 
at any time, since this encourages 
the timid to take risks and allows 
all students to check their own 
progress. 
Several types of paper topics 
seem to work well. In general, in a 
short paper it seems better to ask 
students to focus on interpreting 
one text while bringing others in as 
points of comparison, since it takes 
a great deal of sophistication to 
give two complex texts equal 
weight in a short paper without 
oversimplifying. Three sorts of top- 
ics that have proved successful are 
those that point to a moral or polit- 
ical dilemma that is seemingly left 
unresolved by the text (such as the 
conflict between familial and com- 
munal obligations posed by the 
story of Upright Kung in Analects 
13.18); those that take off from an 
apparent tension between aspects 
of a single text; and those that ask 
students to respond to some con- 
troversial interpretation of the text 
(such as J. B. White's critique of 
Thucydides' Diodotus, or David 
Wong's claim that Hsiin Tzu is a 
"prototechnological" thinker). In 
all of these, our aim is to have stu- 
dents move from very particular 
moments in the text to broader 
questions. One way to do this is to 
ask students to consider themselves 
modern disciples of the ancient 
masters. 
Our responses to these papers 
are perhaps even more important 
than our choice of paper topics. 
We try to arrange that both of us 
comment on the same paper, at 
least some of the time, to let stu- 
dents see that a variety of ap- 
proaches is possible. In larger 
classes, of course, and for those 
with heavier teaching loads than 
our 3/2, this will not be possible. 
But here one could still try experi- 
menting with short, ungraded, writ- 
ten assignments (perhaps 15-20 
minute in-class writings) that are 
then discussed in small groups. At 
any rate, thinking about the kind of 
writing students do in these courses 
should not be treated as separate 
from thinking about the substance 
of the course. It is not a matter of 
evaluation and grading only: our 
expectations about and responses 
to student writing directly affect the 
development of those interpretive 
skills and habits needed to address 
the Socratic/Confucian question. 
Notes 
1. A longer version of this paper, enti- 
tled "Teaching Comparative Political Philos- 
ophy: Rationale, Problems, Strategies, or, 
On Trying To Avoid The Anthropologist/ 
Economist/Missionary Trilemma," was pre- 
sented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, and 
is available from the authors on request. 
The subtitle refers to our attempt to teach 
philosophical texts comparatively while 
avoiding three things: the contextualist re- 
duction of philosophy to an aspect of the 
anthropologist's "culture"; the universalist 
reduction of philosophy to an effect of the 
economist's laws; and the moralistic reduc- 
tion of philosophy to good and bad dogmas 
by sectarian missionaries both religious and 
secular. 
2. As Tocqueville noted, busy democrats 
tend to be addicted, against their own best 
interests, to simplifying theories. 
3. Searle, p. 39. Kermode's discussion 
of the uses of "classic" texts is most help- 
ful, especially for his account of the conflict 
about how the classic should be repre- 
sented, between those who see "the classic 
as a closed book that learning can partly 
open, and those who assert that the classic 
is a more or less open text from which new 
readings may be generated, not the charms 
of antiquity imperfectly understood, but im- 
portant new senses" (p. 75). Two other 
strong nontraditional defenses of the central- 
ity of classical texts for liberal learning are 
Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep, and 
Eva Brann, Paradoxes of Education in a 
Republic. 
4. And such proliferation is the way 
scholarly disciplines typically resolve inter- 
nal disputes, no matter how fundamental. 
Both traditionalists and radicals are comfort- 
ably accommodated within the framework of 
existing disciplines and the departmental 
structure of research universities. Gerald 
Graff's study of the history of American de- 
partments of English over the last hundred 
years documents and discusses this ten- 
dency and its negative implications for lib- 
eral education. Graff's central point is that 
radical challenges are typically resolved by 
establishing new faculty positions for the 
erstwhile radicals, rather than by a debate 
about how the department should under- 
stand its purpose followed by a re-organiza- 
tion of the faculty in the light of that debate. 
5. This dilemma is both recognized and 
exemplified in the recent APSA report on 
"Liberal Learning and the Political Science 
Major" (Wahlke 1991). Recognizing that the 
major should not be "a pre-professional pro- 
gram to train political scientists" (p. 50), but 
reluctant to criticize or exclude any cur- 
rently prominent research program, the re- 
port in effect throws up its hands at settling 
on a set of questions or approaches to guide 
undergraduate education and says that stu- 
dents should learn to ask, "Which particular 
mode of analysis is appropriate to this par- 
ticular question" (p. 52)-as if "modes of 
analysis" had no part in setting both the 
terms and the substance of the questions 
they address. Kaufman-Osborne (1990) 
makes a cogent historical argument for free- 
ing our thoughts about the undergraduate 
major from the "imperialism" of the re- 
search practices prevailing in graduate de- 
partments. 
6. So far we have offered an upper-level 
course on the origins of philosophy in China 
and Greece several times, a sophomore-level 
course on texts from the European and Chi- 
nese enlightenments, called "Brave New 
Worlds," and a seminar for freshmen and 
sophomores on ways of thinking about piety 
and death in ancient China and Greece. We 
could not have begun to teach any of these 
courses without outside support to cover 
our other course commitments. The devel- 
opment of the first course was supported by 
a grant from the Ford Foundation; the other 
two were funded by a Knight Foundation 
grant. 
7. This fundamental parallel between 
Socratic and Confucian activity is brilliantly 
drawn by Benjamin Schwartz (1985), 76-79. 
Schwartz is pre-eminent among specialists in 
early Chinese philosophy in his understand- 
ing of Greek philosophy, and hence in his 
ability to draw thought-provoking compari- 
sons between the two traditions. Any spe- 
cialist in European political theory who 
wants to begin reading the Chinese classics 
would do well to read The World of Thought 
in Ancient China at the first opportunity. 
8. The structuralist trope of constructing 
an invisible agent and calling it the "cul- 
ture" of a people destroys philosophy, and 
especially comparative philosophy, and is to 
be avoided. The reification of culture be- 
longs to anthropology, and is especially visi- 
ble in traditional ethnographic functionalism, 
which seems to operate on the maxim that, 
as Aristotle didn't say, Culture makes noth- 
ing in vain. The word "society" has been 
used similarly by sociologists like Durkheim, 
for whom, Alan Wolfe says, "Society is like 
the hero of an epic saga, possessing super- 
human qualities at which ordinary mortals 
can only wonder" (p. 221). 
9. In the case of old words used in new 
ways, Eno's discussion of the Confucian 
texts suggests that it might be fascinating to 
compare the way Plato and Aristotle use 
phusis (roughly, nature) with the transforma- 
tions of t'ien (roughly, heaven) in Con- 
fucius, Mencius, and Hsiin Tzu. For a very 
interesting discussion of the similar work 
done by dunamislenergeia (potentiality/actu- 
ality) in Aristotle and ch'i/li (energy/princi- 
ple) in Chu Hsi, see Clark, pp. 212-16. 
10. Mencius 5b8, p. 158 in the D. C. Lau 
translation. Wayne Booth, with no reference 
to Mencius, but with Aristotle's discussion 
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of friendship in mind, presents a similar way 
of thinking about books. For Booth, the 
value of reading is the creation of an ethical 
culture in which we make friends with the 
author of the text-not the historical author, 
but the one implied or constructed by our 
reading. "Friendship" here suggests various 
kinds of friends-those who are simply fun 
to be with because they flatter or amuse us, 
those who are useful informants about 
something that we need to know about, but 
especially those who can criticize as well as 
confirm our deepest commitments and habits. 
11. One of the curious hallmarks of this 
group is its tendency to claim that what it 
does isn't "analytic" philosophy at all, it's 
just plain philosophy, philosophy tout 
court-after all, who could be against clarity 
and articulateness? T. Irwin exhibits the 
characteristic tone and substance of this re- 
fusal to grant even the possibility that the 
term philosophy might be contested: "I 
rather deprecate the use of the term Anglo- 
American [his italics] to refer to a philo- 
sophical school or outlook. And I doubt if 
there are any techniques characteristic of 
contemporary Anglo-American (as opposed 
to medieval Latin or eighteenth-century 
German) philosophy" (in Griswold, p. 195). 
12. A view of the character of philosophy 
roughly similar to that of post-Cartesian 
European philosophers-valuing strict de- 
ductive argument and aspiring to univocity 
at all times-seems to have been held in 
ancient China by the Mohist "logicians," 
whose writings were marginalized as imprac- 
tical by later canon builders. 
13. See the articles in Griswold for a 
sense of the debate about Plato-interpreta- 
tion between analytic philosophers and 
others. 
14. Schwartz (1985) discusses the emer- 
gence of philosophy understood in this way 
in terms of Karl Jaspers' concept of the 
"Axial Age," the period during the first mil- 
lennium B.C., when a new kind of writing 
and thought began to appear in several 
places, including China and Greece, writing 
in which one finds something different from 
a priestly enunciation of prevailing codes 
and beliefs, but instead, in Schwartz's 
words, "a kind of standing back and looking 
beyond; of questioning and reflectivity as 
well as the emergence of new positive per- 
spectives and visions" (p. 3). Robert Eno 
makes an excellent case for reading the 
Analects as a "philosophically self-con- 
scious text" (p. 81) in these terms. Eno also 
provides good readings of Mencius and 
Hsiin Tzu as texts of this kind. For related 
arguments about the philosophic character 
of the Chuang Tzu, see Wu, especially pp. 
266-77, and Hansen (1983); for Mencius, see 
Yearley (1990). All stress the different ways 
in which these authors insist on giving rea- 
sons rather than accepting rules or revela- 
tions, and the need to take seriously their 
claims to true belief and persuasive argu- 
ment if we are to be adequate readers. For a 
comparable treatment of the meaning of 
Socratic logos as something different from 
either deductive logic or prophetic vision, 
see Desjardins (1990). 
15. For insightful discussions of this issue 
and of the question of African philosophy in 
comparative perspective generally, see Ap- 
piah (1992) and Outlaw (1993). 
16. For Jacques Gernet (pp. 26-29), the 
primary explainer of cultural difference is 
that the Greeks were seafarers and pastoral- 
ists, while the Chinese were settled agricul- 
turists. 
17. The "absence" of cosmogony 
"causes" the Chinese to have a uniquely 
organismic view of the universe, one that 
makes no distinction between facts and val- 
ues (Graham, p. 29), and one that never sep- 
arates subjectivity from the world (Tu, p. 12), 
one that sees value as immanent in the 
world rather than a matter of external uni- 
versal principle (Hall and Ames, pp. 323- 
25)-in all these cases, the "absence" is 
presented as the reason the Chinese have 
been able to avoid some bad beliefs; or, 
they can be used to show that the Chinese 
never had a "scientific revolution" (Sivin's 
critique of this way of stating the question is 
very helpful) or a sense of individual 
"rights"-these things being (usually) taken 
to be good. The process here often seems to 
be that an author adopts a prevailing (West- 
ern) critique of Western philosophy, gener- 
ally one stemming from the Nietzschean 
and/or Heideggerian critique of fundamental 
ontology, and then proceeds to find that cri- 
tique already present (though never, of 
course, explicit-that's what our author is 
for) in Chinese philosophy. Pocock (pp. 17- 
18), speaking of the Westernizing distortions 
in the readings of certain Chinese texts that 
are inspired by the desire to discover a 
Good Other that appears to manifest the op- 
posite of everything we hate about our- 
selves, waxes appropriately satiric: "It is 
very easy to understand the appeal of this 
perception for moderns trying to live in a 
post-individualist, post-industrial and proba- 
bly post-revolutionary world . . . though 
when it [the idea of the Taoist self and the 
politics of the wu wei] is practised in faece 
Calvini, among the debris of Protestant indi- 
vidualism, some very curious jetsam enters 
the original current." (pp. 17-18). 
18. See Girardot for an argument that the 
question of Chinese cosmogony is much 
more complex than the simple "absence" 
analysis suggests; see Graham (pp. 389-428) 
for similarly complicating the issue of ex- 
pressions in Chinese (and other languages) 
comparable to the English "to be" or the 
Greek einai, and an interesting and appro- 
priately inconclusive discussion of the ad- 
vantages and disadvantages of the different 
formulations. 
19. Gadamer, pp. 333-40. Gadamer takes 
this idea-that the way to determine the 
meaning of a text is to try to reconstruct the 
question to which the text is an answer- 
from the Autobiography of R. G. Colling- 
wood. 
20. "Thus a person who seeks to under- 
stand must question what lies behind what is 
said. He must understand it as an answer to 
a question .... We understand the sense of 
the text only by acquiring the horizon of the 
question that, as such, necessarily includes 
other possible answers" Gadamer, p. 333. 
21. Of course, hypotheses of this kind can 
and should be floated all the time-but they 
cannot become the goal of the course with- 
out subverting its purposes, at least as we 
understand them. Schwartz (1964, p. 2) 
notes that in discussing cross-cultural en- 
counters we need to take care to avoid 
treating cultures as static monoliths: "I 
would suggest that in dealing with the en- 
counter between the West and any given 
non-Western society and culture, there can 
be no escape from the necessity of immers- 
ing ourselves as deeply as possible in the 
specificities of both worlds simultaneously. 
We are not dealing with a known and an 
unknown variable but with two vast, ever- 
changing, highly problematic areas of human 
experience." 
22. For the social and political history of 
pre-Ch'in China, Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient 
China in Transition is a good introduction; 
for the political context of Athenian philoso- 
phy, see J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Athe- 
nian Democracy. 
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Appendix: Three Syllabuses 
General Studies 204 
Sophomore Humanities Seminar: 
Brave New Worlds 
Format and Assignments: Sections will 
meet together on Wednesdays, sepa- 
rately for the other two weekly meet- 
ings. There will be seven short papers 
assigned during the course, as indicated 
below. In lieu of a final examination, 
there will be an option of re-writing one 
of the seven papers at the end of the 
term. 
Class Schedule: 
Week 1 (January 23-27: Niccolo Machi- 
avelli, The Prince 
Week 2 (January 30-February 3): The 
Prince; Thomas More, Utopia. 
Week 3 (February 6-10): Utopia. 
First Paper Due More and/or Machiav- 
elli (4-5 pages): Friday, Feb. 10. 
Week 4 (February 13-17): K'ang 
Yu-wei, The One-World Philosophy of 
K'ang Yu-Wei, Parts 1 and 2, plus one 
of the later chapters of your choice (on 
racism, sexism, etc.). 
Second Paper Due (2 pages): Friday, 
Feb. 17. 
Week 5 (February 20-24: William 
Shakespeare, The Tempest. 
Week 6 (February 27-March 3): John 
Milton, Paradise Lost, Books 1, 2, 3 
(lines 1-143), 4, 5, 9, 10. 
Third Paper Due Shakespeare (2 pag- 
es): Friday, March 3. 
Week 7 (March 6-10): Paradise Lost. 
Spring Break 
Week 8 (March 20-24): Paradise Lost 
Fourth Paper Due (4-5 pages): Friday, 
March 24 
Week 9 (March 27-31): Wang Yang- 
ming, Inquiry on the "Great Learn- 
ing"; Instructions for Practical Living, 
sections 2-7, 9-10, 15-16, 24, 26, 28, 
30-34, 38, 44, 52, 58, 62, 76, 86, 99, 
101, 122-123, 127, 134-136, 138-139, 
195-200, 202, 222, 226, 228, 231, 272, 
276, 279, 282, 293. 
Week 10 (April 3-7): Wang Yang-ming. 
Fifth Paper Due (4-5 pages): Friday, 
April 7 
Week 11 (April 10-14): Rene Descartes, 
Discourse on Method; Meditations on 
First Philosophy, Second Meditation. 
Week 12 (April 17-21): Descartes 
Week 13 (April 24-28): Jonathan Swift, 
Gulliver's Travels, Parts 1 and 3 (read 
through once), Part 4 (read carefully). 
Sixth Paper Due Descartes and/or Swift 
(4-5 pages): Friday, April 28 
Week 14 (May 1-5): Li Ju-chen, Flow- 
ers in the Mirror, pp. 17-133 in the Lin 
Tai-yi translation (through the voyage 
to the city of women). 
Seventh Paper Due (2 pages): Monday, 
May 8 
Optional Rewrite due end of exam 
period 
Rationale for the Choice and 
the Order of Reading 
A standard periodization of Euro- 
pean and Chinese cultural history lies 
behind our choice of readings. For Eu- 
rope, it is conventional to date the be- 
ginning of Western "modernity" from 
around the beginning of the 16th cen- 
tury. This dating assumes that a set of 
fundamental changes occurred during 
the period 1500-1789: the breakdown of 
the feudal order and the emergence of 
unified nation-states; increasing en- 
counter with non-European people and 
extensive colonization; the flourishing 
of commercial markets; the separation 
of religious and political authority; the 
emergence of modern natural science; 
the separation of individual identity 
from inherited social position. The Eu- 
ropean readings in the course provide 
ways of naming and responding to 
these transformations. 
For Chinese intellectual history, it is 
conventional to distinguish four peri- 
ods. The first or ancient era runs from 
about the 6th to the 2d century B.C. 
(Spring and Autumn Annals and War- 
ring States periods), and centers around 
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the classical Confucian and Taoist 
texts. The second period (sometimes 
called "medieval" runs from the Han 
to the Sung dynasties (up to the 10th 
century A.D.), and features the entry 
of Buddhism into the Chinese world. 
The third (sometimes called "modern") 
is the period of Sung (e.g., Chu Hsi) 
and Ming neo-Confucianism (from the 
11th through the 18th centuries), a se- 
ries of attempts to consolidate and so- 
lidify the Confucian tradition in ways 
that take account of the challenges of 
Buddhism and of popular Taoism. Last 
is the contemporary period, the 19th 
and 20th centuries, characterized by 
responses to the challenge of Europe. 
We begin with Machiavelli and More 
since both of them exhibit a dissatisfac- 
tion with the present order of society, 
and an inclination to look backward as 
a way of imagining a transformed 
present-NM explicitly, by recom- 
mending the study of history, and More 
(or Hythloday, at least) by calling up 
the image of a simpler time or out-of- 
time. Both also suggest ideas of the 
virtues that are against their age, and 
present characters (Hythloday and the 
Prince) who suggest the figure of the 
modern "individual," the self-made 
man. In each there is also a tension 
between two central elements of the 
Western tradition, Christianity and 
classical republicanism. Both texts are 
also complex in raising questions about 
the relation of the author to the text- 
More to Hythloday, Machiavelli to his 
Florentine counselor. 
K'ang Yu-wei comes in at a much 
later period, the 19th century Chinese 
turn toward the West as threat and 
promise, but we start here because we 
think it's good to introduce China as 
soon as possible, and because the is- 
sues here are more easily accessible to 
students without any knowledge of 
China than would be the case with ear- 
lier texts. K'ang Yu-wei's One-World 
is a prediction of a utopian future that 
rests on the premise that neo-Confu- 
cianism properly understood can be 
made fully compatible with the essence 
of European science and democracy. 
Here we introduce the idea of a tradi- 
tion resting upon a set of texts (the 
Analects of Confucius and related com- 
mentaries) and the way controversial 
interpretations of "sacred" texts can 
serve to imagine social arrangements 
and ways of life. 
The Tempest introduces one Euro- 
pean conception of West and non- 
West, and continues the utopian theme, 
along with introducing the genre of ro- 
mance. Paradise Lost picks up the 
theme of interpreting and "justifying" 
a sacred text begun in K'ang Yu-wei, 
thinking about Milton's new version of 
Genesis and the idea of an epic poetry 
that celebrates the world as it is. 
Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) reacted 
against the neo-Confucian orthodoxy 
based on the works of Chu Hsi (1130- 
1200), who was the grand synthesizer 
and codifier of earlier Chinese thought 
during the turn to the "modern" pe- 
riod. Wang Yang-ming's was a kind of 
inward turning, away from rationality 
and inquiry associated with Chu Hsi, 
toward insistence on innate knowledge 
of the good, a connection between the 
structure of the human soul (hsin) and 
the structure of the cosmos, a unity of 
thought and action-all made compati- 
ble with traditional filial piety. 
Descartes also turns inward in his 
self-consciously novel and anti-tradi- 
tional rules for both intellectual and 
moral conduct. To be stressed here is 
the Cartesian dichotomy between spiri- 
tual and material things, and his attack 
on the idea of tradition (including the 
literary tradition) as such. The Dis- 
course is to be read as a prospective 
apologia for modern science as a prac- 
tice or way of life. Genre questions 
also arise here-what is a work of 
"autobiography", "philosophy", "sci- 
ence", "fiction", "religion"? 
Gulliver's Travels is to be read in 
part as a critique of the aspirations of 
the Cartesian Enlightenment, a satire 
on the new world of science and com- 
merce, one whose ending suggests a 
picture of modernity as dilemma. We 
end with Flowers in the Mirror (Li 
Ju-chen, 1763-1830), a satiric, though 
cheerful, novel of voyages to imaginary 
lands that is in some respects a Chinese 
Gulliver. 
General Studies 204 
Piety and Death: China and Greece 
A consideration of some ways in which 
writers in two cultural contexts gave 
accounts of the lines separating and 
connecting the human and the divine, 
the living and the dead. The focus will 
be on developing strategies for making 
sense of challenging and unfamiliar 
texts, and on figuring out how to get 
texts from two different traditions to 
speak to one another. No special back- 
ground is presupposed, and there are 
no prerequisites. The course has been 
designed with sophomores and juniors 
primarily in mind. 
There will be six short papers (total 
length, approximately 25 pages). The 
papers will be on the texts discussed in 
class. Because of its writing-intensive 
character, the course is not open to 
freshmen except those who are exempt 
from English 015. 
Schedule of Readings and Papers: 
September 4 and 6: Introduction: Histori- 
cal background: China in the Spring and 
Autumn Annals and Warring States peri- 
ods (722-222 B.C.E.) and the Athenian 
polis in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.E. 
Consideration of selected sample Chi- 
nese and Greek texts from the period. 
September 9, 11, 13: Sophocles (496- 
406): Antigone 
September 16, 18, 20: Plato (429-347): 
Euthyphro 
First paper due, September 23 
September 23, 25, 27: Confucius (551- 
479): Analects 
Second Paper due, September 30 
September 30, October 2, 4: Hsun Tzu 
(about 310-230) 
October 7, 9, 11: Hsun Tzu 
October 14: Fall break 
Third Paper due, October 16 
October 16, 18: Thucydides (about 460- 
400): Peloponnesian War 
October 21, 23, 25: Thucydides 
Fourth paper due, October 28 
October 28, 30, November 1: Aris- 
tophanes (about 455-385): Birds 
November 4, 6, 8: Euripides (about 485- 
406): Helen 
Fifth paper due, November 11 
November 11, 13, 15: Chuang Tzu 
(between 399 and 295) 
November 18, 20, 22: Plato, Apology and 
Crito 
November 25: Plato 
Sixth paper due, November 27 
November 27: Ying Shao, "On Marvels 
and Spirits" 
November 29: Thanksgiving break 
December 2, 4, 6: Euripides: Bacchae 
December 9: Bacchae 
There will be a self-scheduled final 
examination. 
Rationale for the Choice and the 
Order of the Readings 
We see the books and authors we 
have chosen not as representatives of 
standard Greek or Chinese opinions 
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about piety and death, but as texts that 
introduce problems and perplexities 
about these matters, and are as a result 
open to a variety of interpretations and 
re-interpretations. The order of read- 
ings is therefore neither chronological 
nor one-culture or one-genre-at-a-time, 
but designed to generate as high a level 
of interpretive comparison among texts 
as possible, both in class discussions 
and in student papers. 
We will begin with the Antigone be- 
cause it seems the most accessible and 
exciting point of entry into thinking and 
speaking about the obligations of the 
living to the dead, about possible con- 
flicts between family and citizenship, 
and about the tensions between under- 
standing the human world in terms of 
secular interest and understanding it in 
terms of our exchanges with divinity. 
The Antigone is also valuable as a text 
with several distinct voices and consid- 
erable uncertainty about how we are to 
understand them. Plato's Euthyphro 
continues all of these questions con- 
cerning the relationship of the polis to 
divinity as well as bringing out another 
that is also implicit in Antigone: What 
is the relationship of the philosopher or 
poet to both polis and the gods? 
Confucius' Analects allows us to talk 
about the issues of piety and death in 
relation to a text that is aphoristic 
rather than dramatic, and so to con- 
front and articulate a different form of 
uncertainty in interpretation. The un- 
certainty and the question of possible 
irony is especially complex here, since 
Confucius is famous for his asserted 
unwillingness to speak about spirits or 
the dead. Moreover, Confucius insists 
that he is saying nothing new in his 
own voice, but instead transmitting and 
reviving a faded and precious antiquity. 
His love of the past, however, is not a 
passive reverence or a turning away 
from the present but the basis and in- 
centive for proposing what he calls a 
correction or rectification of language. 
How can his stance-that of the 
teacher or scholar-toward "the tradi- 
tion" be compared with that of the 
poet or the philosopher in Athens? 
What new insights and questions can 
such comparison yield? 
In trying to make sense of the Con- 
fucian concepts of filial piety (hsiao), 
goodness (jen), virtue or moral force 
(te), and rites of ceremony (li), among 
others, we have the chance to intro- 
duce the general question of similarities 
and differences, analogies and disanalo- 
gies between The Analects and the 
texts of Sophocles and Plato studied 
earlier-an interpretive procedure that 
can be continued throughout the 
course. We can also begin to consider 
some larger comparative questions 
about the possibility that we are seeing 
analogous ways of understanding the 
world and our place in it-analogies, 
for example, between the Chinese con- 
cepts tao (way), li, and fa (law) and the 
Greek nomos and physis, or between 
the ways of imagining equality and hi- 
erarchy (as well as unity and differ- 
ence) among human beings that are im- 
plicit in the representations of the 
empire ruled by the son of heaven and 
the democratic polis ruled by a political 
elite. 
Hsiin Tzu is an author who attempts 
to clarify and extend Confucian insights 
and the Confucian project of rectifying 
language in opposition both to other 
Confucians (e.g., Mencius) and to some 
outside the school entirely (examples: 
Chuang Tzu and the Mohists). By plac- 
ing the Hsun Tzu at this point in the 
course, we can continue working within 
the tradition of Confucianism for an- 
other several weeks, this time by exam- 
ining a text that is easier for students to 
grasp at first reading than the Analects, 
since it proceeds by connected reflec- 
tion and systematic argument rather 
than aphoristically, and since it is ex- 
plicitly concerned with causality. At 
the same time, it is more clearly rooted 
in a context of an intense debate within 
Chinese culture concerning the meaning 
of piety and ritual and of the appropri- 
ate relationship of the human and the 
divine, of the transcendent principles of 
heaven or the cosmos and the humanly 
conceived rules and forms of social life. 
The paper to be written at this point 
may be a little more substantial than 
the first two, since students should now 
be able both to return to the Analects 
and to reconsider the Greek texts as 
sources for their own delineations of 
Chinese-Greek analogy and difference. 
As in all the papers from here on, we 
will ask students to focus on some 
problem about the meaning or structure 
of a given text while bearing in mind 
the way in which other texts can clarify 
or interestingly complicate that problem. 
In reading Thucydides over the fol- 
lowing two weeks, we can indicate 
points of possible connectiofi between 
the interest in discerning causes his ac- 
count of the Peloponnesian war shares 
with Hsiin Tzu, and their shared sense 
of the possibility of a divine order that 
somehow lurks within human history- 
though not in any simple or simply visi- 
ble way: Thucydides takes his distance 
from traditional Greek divination prac- 
tices; Hsiin Tzu is unremittingly hostile 
towards their Chinese counterparts. It 
might also be suggested that Thucy- 
dides' assertion that his own written 
composition is a "thing for all times," 
as well as his argument for the crucial 
importance of the possibility of mean- 
ingful speech within and among poleis 
raises interesting points of comparison 
with Hsiin Tzu's discussion of the re- 
demptive function of rites and music in 
human life. 
The next two readings, the Birds and 
Helen, are a clear change of pace. 
These plays serve as a kind of bridge 
section of the course, separating works 
that take Greek or Chinese cultural tra- 
dition seriously from those which in 
one way or another appear (though per- 
haps it is only an appearance) to sug- 
gest radical revisions. Aristophanes' 
comedy and Euripides' play are both 
fantasies that draw attention to their 
own status as inventive reconceptions 
of the intermingling of divinity and hu- 
manity. These works of the imagination 
draw attention to their attempt to open 
up new ways of thinking and writing 
about divinity, ways that seem to de- 
mythologize traditional accounts of 
gods and heroes, of heaven and earth, 
perhaps reducing the sense of distance, 
and surely reducing the sense of solem- 
nity that seems to accompany tradi- 
tional Athenian piety. Do they also 
subvert it? 
In the last section of the course we 
encounter three (or perhaps six, count- 
ing authors) extraordinary figures who 
appear to live in the borderlands be- 
tween divinity and humanity, each of 
them singularly attractive and discon- 
certing: Chuang Tzu, Plato's Socrates, 
and Euripides' Dionysus. The texts 
considered here also firmly connect the 
human awareness of divinity to the hu- 
man experience of death, sometimes 
elaborately horrible death. 
Chuang Tzu, perhaps in a way analo- 
gous to the aporia-inducing Socrates, 
seems wholeheartedly both to reject 
and to endorse contemporary conven- 
tions, to pass beyond words and yet to 
live within a storm of word-play, to 
withdraw from the ordinary world of 
mortals and yet to interrogate that 
world with persistent and serious en- 
gagement. Do ironies operate in 
Chuang Tzu's fables, as they may in 
Socratic speech? What is the status of 
the sometimes conflicting theories and 
doctrines that both Chuang Tzu and 
Socrates assert? Are they better under- 
stood as revered sages of Taoism and 
the Higher Law respectively, or as fig- 
ures who jokingly initiate us into a way 
that is not quite either the tao or a 
nomos? 
The Bacchae is the last item on the 
agenda, not because it in some way 
sums up lines that will have been fol- 
lowed in the rest of the course, but be- 
cause it contains so many interpretive 
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possibilities (and so many fireworks) 
that it stands a fair chance of combat- 
ing any end-of-semester depression that 
may infiltrate our closing discussion of 
piety and death. 
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Origins of Philosophy: 
China and Greece 
A consideration of the period between 
the 6th and the 3rd centuries B.C., 
when certain individuals in both China 
and Greece began to regard critically 
and self-consciously the cultures in 
which they lived. 
Requirements: Students are expected to 
do the assigned readings before coming 
to class; informed participation in class 
discussion will be an element of the 
final grade. There will be four short 
papers (total length: 20-25 pages) as 
indicated below. These will be interpre- 
tive essays on the texts we consider in 
class. There will be a self-scheduled 
final examination. 
Schedule of Readings and Papers 
January 19: Introduction 
January 21: Benjamin Schwartz, Intro- 
duction and Chapter 1 from The World 
of Thought in Ancient China (xeroxed 
handout) 
January 26 and 28: Cho-yun Hsu, 
Ancient China in Transition Frank J. 
Frost, Greek Society, chs. 1-5 
February 2 and 4: Confucius (551-479): 
Anlects, esp. Chs. 1-9, 12, 13 Thucy- 
dides (about 460-400): The Peloponne- 
sian War (pp. 35-49, 72-87, 143-164, 
212-245, 400-437, 455-470, 516-537) 
February 9 and 11: Confucius and 
Thucydides 
February 16: Confucius and Thucy- 
dides 
February 17: First Paper Due, 5 P.M. 
February 18: Chuang Tzu (between 339 
and 295) Heraclitus (fl. 500) and Par- 
menides (fl. 475), Fragments (xeroxed 
handout) 
February 23 and 25: Chuang Tzu and 
Pre-Socratics 
March 1 and 3: Chuang Tzu and Pre- 
Socratics 
March 4: Second Paper Due, 5 P.M. 
Spring Break 
March 15 and 17: Mencius (371-289?) 
Plato (429-347): Phaedrus 
March 22 and 24: Mencius and 
Phaedrus 
March 29 and 31: Mencius and 
Phaedrus 
April 4: Third Paper Due, 5 P.M. 
April 5 and 7:Hsun Tzu (fl. 298-238) 
Aristotle (384-322): Nicomachean 
Ethics 
April 12 and 14: Hsiin Tzu and Aristo- 
tle, Parts of Animals, Book 1 (xeroxed 
handout) 
April 19 and 21: Hsun Tzu and Aristotle 
April 26 and 28: Hsun Tzu and Aristotle 
Final Paper Due-Last Day for Written 
Work 
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The airing in the Soviet Union of the 
Donahue space bridges transformed 
the Soviet public's image of itself." 
Interview with Vladimir Pozner, 
Moscow, 1989 
After Remembering War, when I 
toured the Soviet Union as a musi- 
cian, even in the remotest village, 
people came up and hailed me as a 
hero. 
S. Frederick Starr, President, 
Oberlin College, jazz clarinetist, 
Sovietologist and U.S. moderator 
for Remembering War 
The Growth of a Medium 
During the decade 1982-92, 
groups in the United States joined 
with various Soviet institutions to 
develop new forms of communica- 
tion between citizens of the United 
States and the former Soviet 
Union. They did so in an era that 
began with deep mutual mistrust 
and ended in bewilderment, an era 
that began with the president of the 
United States referring to the So- 
viet Union as the "evil empire," 
and ended with the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union itself. 
One result of efforts to exploit 
and effect changing climates of 
opinion in both the United States 
and the Soviet Union has been the 
emergence of a new cultural form 
called the "space bridge." Trans- 
lated from the Russian word, 
telemost, a space bridge is an inter- 
active television link between at 
least two geographically separate 
and culturally distinct locations. 
In contrast to teleconferences, 
space bridges are public events. 
Whereas teleconferencing brings 
together small groups for special- 
ized discussions or lectures on in- 
teractive television, space bridges 
are more like interactive theater, in 
which the dialogue occurs between 
sites as well as between key partic- 
ipants, moderators, and unnamed 
audience members. Space bridges 
provide a space in which ordinary 
citizens can appear in public as a 
public. 
I first became interested in space 
bridges in the summer of 1983. 
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